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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:
The New-Used Motor
vehicle Dealer's License,
DICK and LAVONNE NOREN, dba
central R.V. Sales

Case No. 16521

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The respondent-appellant, Administrator of Motor
Vehicle Business Administration, appeals from a decision of
the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, which ordered
the Administrator to grant the application of petitionersrespondents for a New-Used Motor Vehicle Dealer's License and
to duly license them under the laws of the State of Utah.
Jurisdiction was conferred uPon the Third District Court by
wayofastatutorily provided appeal from a decision of the
Administrator after he adopted the findings of the Advisory
Board to deny the application for a New-Used Motor Vehicle
Dealer's License.
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
This case carne before the Third District Court as an
appeal from the decision of the Administrator of Motor Vehicle
Business Administration in which the Administrator denied the
application of Dick and LaVonne Noren for a New-Used Motor
Vehicle Dealer's License.

The Administrator filed motions for

publication of the transcript of the hearing held before the
Advisory Board to the Administrator and for summary judgment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The law and motion judge for the Third District Court heard
'arguments on the Administrator's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied the same.

The matter then proceeded to trial where,

pursuant to stipulation by the respective counsel in open court,
the Third District Court Judge narrowed the issue to that of
deciding as a matter of law whether the proceeding in district
court was a trial de novo or a review of an administrative
decision.

The court took U1e matter under advisement.

A memo-

randum of law was filed by the Administrator after which the
court ordered that the Administrator of the Motor Vehicle
Business Administration forthwith grant the application of the
petitioners for a New-Used Motor Vehicle Dealer's License.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Third District Court
decision wherein the court substituted its judgment for that of
the administrative body and an order affirming the decision of
the Administrator of Motor Vehicle Business Administration in
denying the respondents' application for a New-Used Motor
Vehicle Dealer's License.
STATE~~NT

OF FACTS

In January of 1979 the respondents filed with the Motor
Vehicle Business Administration an application for a New-Used
Motor Vehicle Delaer's License (R. 15).

The application was

proper insofar as the formal requirements prescribed.

Sub-

sequently, the Administrator issued notice of an order to show
cause hearing which notified the applicants that the AdministraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tor was contemplating denying the application on the grounds
that Richard Scott Noren had been convicted in the City Court
of Salt Lake City, Utah for two separate violations of the
Motor Vehicle Code, failure to deliver a certificate of title,
and acting as a used-motor vehicle dealer without a license
(R. 15).

Pursuant to statute, the Administrator directed the

hearing on the order to show cause to be held before the
Advisory Board.

This statutorily created Advisory Board con-

ducted a formal hearing on March 12, 1979.

A stenographic

record of the hearing of temtimony, offers of proof and oral
argument were made. The Board took the matter under advisement and
subsequently

issued formal findings of fact and a recommenda-

tion that no motor vehicle dealer's license be issued to the
applicants therefor, for the reason of Richard Scott Noren's
prior criminal convictions.

Thereafter, the Administrator

adopted the Advisory Board's findings of fact and ordered that
no motor vehicle dealer's license be issued.
Pursuant to statute, the applicants appealed from the
decision of the Administrator to the Third District Court by
filing an original action.

Prior to such an appeal, the appli-

cants' motion to set aside his prior convictions was granted
by the Honorable Raymond F.

(R. 16) .

Uno of the Fifth Circuit Court

The Administrator filed motions for publication of

the transcript of the hearing held before the Advisory Board
to the Administrator and for Summary Judgment (R. 4-6).

The

Law and Motion Judge for the Third District Court heard argu-

ments on the Administrator's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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denied the same

(R. 12) .

The matter then proceeded to trial

where, pursuant to stipulation by the respective counsel in
open court, the Third District Court Judge narrowed the issue t:
that of deciding as a matter of law whether the proceeding in
district court was a trial de novo or a review of an administrative decision.
(R. 13).

The court took the matter under advisement

A memorandum of law was filed by the Administrator

(R. 20-36) , after which the court ordered that the Administrator
of the Motor Vehicle Business Administration forthwith grant lli
application of the petitioners for a New-Used Motor Vehicle
Dealer's License (R. 18).
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF RESPONDENT'S TWO
PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN DECIDING
HIS FITNESS TO HOLD A PUBLIC LICENSE.
The trial court erred in excluding evidence of Richard
Scott Noren's two prior criminal convictions for violations of
the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act.

Utah Code Ann. §41-3-8, author-

izes the Motor Vehicle Business Administrator to refuse to
issue a license to a partnershir:> applicant where he determines:
(3) {a)
. that one or more of the partners
though not previously the holder of a license,
was convicted in a court of record in the state of
Utah of a violation of one or more of the terms
and provisions of this act or of a rule or regulation promulgated by the administrator under the
authoritv herein conferred uPon him; and (b) that
by reaso~ of the facts and circumstances touching
the organization, control, and management of the
partnership or corporation business is likely that
the policy of such business will be directed, controlled, or managed by individuals who, by reason
of their conviction of a violation of the proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vtsions of this act, would be ineligible for a
llcense and that by licensing such corporation
or partnership the purposes of this act would
likely be defeated.
Whether sitting asa review tribunal or as if it were
the administrative body, the district court was bound to consider Mr. Noren's convictions of the Motor Vehicle Dealers'
Act as evidence of his fitness for a public license.

The

legislature went to great length to specify that a conviction
of a criminal violation of the very act which an applicant for
an automobile dealer's license would be obliged to uphold,would
be grounds for denying such a license.

In its own words, the

legislature stated that such a conviction demonstrates that
the purposes of the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act "would likely be
defeated."

In short, it is evidence of bad character and an

individual possessing such character should not be trusted
with a public license in an area of business so prone to consumer fraud and injury.
In the administrative setting, exclusionary rules have
no applicability where evidence of good character is material
and relevant.
Title 5,

On the federal level, this is mandated in

u.s.c.,

§556(d).

That provision excludes administrative

hearings from the ambit of the exclusionary rules, through the
Administrative Procedure Act.

The standard which is applied to

the admissability issue is materiality and relevancy.

The

reason being, that the hearings are conducted in front of experts
selected from the field of concern, and not in front of jurors
selected for their "naivete'."

will aid

All evidence is admitted which

the administrative body in its decision making.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the same standard in
Oop Colton Mills v. Administrators, 312 U.S. 126, 85 L.Ed. 624,
61 S.Ct. 524 (1941):
. .
[I] t has long been settled that the
technical rules for the exclusion of evidence
applicable in jurv trials do not apply to pro
ceedings before federal administrative agencies
in the absence of a statutory requirement that
such rules are to be observed.
at 155 (emphasis added),
There is no such statutory requirement in Utah, and the
Utah Rules of Evidence are not applied to administrative hearings, unlike the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which are
applied pursuant to Rule Sl(d).
Because the exclusionary rules do not apply to administra·
tive hearings, the Advisory Board was correct in admitting and
weighing evidence of petitioner's prior criminal convictions,
and it would still be correct in so admitting and weighing such
evidence if it were to rehear the matter, because the evidence
should not be excluded from the administrative hearing.

It

is both material and relevant to petitioner's dealership licensE
application.
This proposition finds support in case law and treatise
discussion.

In the area of licensing, most courts and

legisl~

tures have decided that a showing of "good character" is of
the utmost importance.

In Legal Rights of the Convicted,

Kerper and Kerper, 1974, the authors observe that in

determini~

an applicant's good character, administrative bodies have not
been confined to rules of evidence when they wrote:
Although pardon and other forms of
wiping out a conviction may remove particular
civil disabilities, and, for example, permit

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the convicted person to vote or serve on a jury,
such a pardon or expungement proceeding does not
necessarily, or even by implication restore
"good character."
[C)onviction of a crime
is generally held to be evidence that the offender
lacks the requisite character for the professional
license.
Legal Rights of the Convicted at
44-45
(emphasis added).
The authors further explained at 821, that:
Generally, where an occupational licensing
law disqualifies persons convicted of cr1me,
pardon does not remove the disqualification nor
does it automatically restore a license that
has been revoked on the ground of a criminal
conviction." See People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore,
214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737 (1905) (emphasis added).
Appellant refers the court to two specific examples
wherein courts have upheld administrative license revocations
or denials

despite the fact that the basis for the denials

(criminal convictions) were pardoned or set aside.

In Meyer v.

Bd. of Medical Examiners, 34 Colo.2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949),
the court upheld a doctor's medical license revocation by the
Board of Examiners, even though the conviction was set aside
following a probation period.

The court reasoned that it was

not the legislative intent to "obliterate the record" and "purge
him of the guilt" "for all purposes" as if no action had "ever
been presented against him."

206 P.2d at 1088.

In Re Phillips, 17 Colo.2d 55, 109 P.2d 344

Similarly, in

(1941), the court

upheld a disbarrment of an attorney holding that the lifting
of his sentence by probation did not affect the fact that he
was adjudged guilty of committing the crime as charged.

It only

served to restore some of his lost civil liberties.
The facts in the instant case do not cause any distinction
:rom the above cases because the statute used to set aside
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Mr. Noren's convictions does not operate to destroy evidence
of his prior convictions from consideration as to his fitness
to possess a motor vehicle dealer's license.
Utah Code Ann., §77-35-17, creates a remedy whereby
persons may have a trial court "terminate or set aside a plea
of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the action
and discharge the defendant."

This statute was interpreted by

the Utah Supreme Court and was distinguished from Utah Code
Ann., §77-35-17.5, the section pursuant to which an expungement
motion is made.

In State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876

(Utah 1975),

I

the court noted:
[Under §77-35-17)
[T)he court cannot seal the record, restrict its inspection,
nor bring into operation circumstances which
would allow a response to inquiries relating
to a conviction of crime, as though such conviction had never occurred. The court can
terminate the sentence, set aside a defendant's
plea of guilty, the conviction, dismiss the
action, and discharge the defendant .
Id. at 878.
Thus, Mr. Noren is not able to respond that he has never
been convicted of a crime.

Likewise, his record is not sealed

as it would be under a motion granted pursuant to §77-35-17.5.
If Mr. Noren may not deny his convictions in a judicial proceeding then, a fortiori, under the rules noted earlier, he
.
·
·
·
· ·
·
must answer as to h lS
convlctlons
ln
a d mlnlstratlve
procee d.lngs.:I

The evidence of his conviction is very much material and relevant and there is no basis for its exclusion as his guilt will
always exist, even though the remainder of his sentence has
been waived.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As the only proper basis cited by the lower court for a
reversal of the order of the administrator was the absence of
any evidence of the convictions, the lower court erred and should
be reversed.

Furthermore, as the district court should have

taken cognizance of Mr. Noren's convictions, it should have
sustained the Administrator's decision as a proper exercise of
his discretion in following the provisions of Utah Code Ann.,
§41-3-8.
POINT II
h'HETHER THE APPEAL AND ORIGINAL
ACTION PROVIDED FOR IN UTAH CODE
ANN. §41-3-26 IS A REVIEW OR A
TRIAL DE NOVO THE DISTRICT COURT
IS LIMITED TO DECIDING WHETHER THE
ADMINISTRATOR ACTED PROPERLY IN DENYING
THE APPLICATION FOR DEALER'S LICENSE.
On the day of the trial, the trial court narrowed the
issue to be decided to whether Utah Code Ann., §41-3-26, provided a true trial de novo or whether it merely provided for
a review of the Administrator's decision.

If it was a true

trial de novo, the judge would take cognizance of the setting
aside of the convictions and reverse the Administrator.

If

the proceeding was a review, the judge must uphold the Administrator's decision.

In making its decision, the lower court

specifically found it did not have to decide the case upon the
issue under which it took the case under advisement.

After

noting this conclusion, the trial court erroneously continued:
"[T]he court finds in either event, the reviewing court would
have been allowed to take into consideration a change of underlying Sponsored
£'actsby the
. S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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-

This court decided a similar case to the instant one
and held that a court reviewing the decision of an administrator
charged with deciding the appropriateness of an application
"should simply determine whether the application was rightly
rejected."

United States v. District Court, 121 Utah, 238 P.2d

1132, 1135 (1951).

In that case the Court was reviewing a

decision of the State Water Engineer.

The legislature had pro-

vided a statutory scheme very similar to the one governing this
proceeding.

The legislature provided that any person aggrieved

by the Engineer's decision may bring an "action in the district
court for a plenary review thereof" and that the hearing
"shall proceed as a trial de novo."

there~

The Utah Supreme Court took

the use of the terms "review" and "trial de novo" as an indication that the court shall review only the issues of law and
fact which were involved in the Engineer's decision.
Utah Code Ann., §41-3-26, provides a similar review
standard as involved in United States v. District Court when it
states that an applicant for a dealer's license may "appeal" by
filing "an original action in district court."

Thus, the trial

court in the current controversy should have "simply determine [d:
whether the application was rightly rejected."

This conclusion

is correctly based on several different points of law.
The first point which supports such a conclusion will be
more extensively discussed in Point III, infra, but basically
states that the facts before

~he

district court and hence this

court are the ones that existed on the date of the hearing
before the Advisory Board.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The second point in favor of construing the instant
action as a review of the case as it existed at the time the
administrative decision, i.e. a review, is the rule of statutory
construction which provides that if two interpretations of a
statute are possible, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the constitutional construction will be the governing
interpretation.

This rule is relevant in the instant proceed-

ing due to art. V. sec. 1 of the Utah Constitution which reads:
The powers of the government of the
State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of oowers-properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any functions appertaining to either
of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
(Emphasis added.)
The lower court concluded that it was able to take cognizance of a withdrawal of convictions which were the basis of
In doing so, the court necessarily

the Administrator's decision.

decided that it had jurisdiction of the case in a trial de novo.
Such a construction of Utah Code Ann., §41-3-26, is an unconstitutional one.
Similar separation-of-powers language is found in most
all state constitutions and it is this type of provision which
has led to a view that true de novo trials are traditionally
disfavored in legislative and administrative areas since, in
essence, the court would be forced to exercise a power which
has been expressly reserved to another branch of government by
constitutional mandate.

This would follow in this case since

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the district court has no authority to issue a motor vehicle
dealer's license upon application; such a power is reserved to
the legislature.
Just as the United States v. District Court, the Court
found the term "de novo" had a more restrictive meaning, other
courts have conformed to the constitutional separation of
powers restriction by giving statutes which provide for a trial
or hearing de novo, a restrictive construction which precludes
a court from substituting its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

See 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law, §701.

The authors continue with a statement very much in point to the
instant controversy.
A fortiori, statutes which do not
expressly provide for trial de novo or substitution of judgment but are asserted to authorize
such substitution of judgment by the court will
not be given that construction where it is not
necessary.
Id. at 603
(emphasis added).
As §43-3-26 merely provides for an appeal and an original actioo,
it is not necessary to give it the unconstitutional de novo
interpretation.
The Montana Supreme Court adopted the entire line of
thinking set forth above in Peterson v. Livestock Commission,
120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 152 (1947), when it held that the court
may not exercise nonjudicial powers but may only review as to
the lawfulness of the decision when it stated:
The lower court as well as this court
may not substitute their discretion reposed
in boards and commissions bv leqislatlve act.
(Citations omitted.)
A statute authorizing an appeal to a
court from actlons of a nonJUdlClal body lS
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unconstitutional in so far as it ourports to
foist nonjudicial functions on th~ court, or
invade the powers of such body, as by
empowering a court to control its executive
or administrative discretion.
(Citations omitted.)
It is generally held that a statute
which attempts to place the court-rn-~lace
of a commission or board to try a matter anew
as an administrative body is unconstitutional
as a delegation to the judiciary of nonjudicial
powers
(Citations omitted.)
Statutes providing for appeals somewhat
similar to that under consideration have been
held valid by interpreting them as not granting
trials de novo in the full sense of that expression but as conferring authority for the
court to pass upon the lawfulness only of the
order of the board or commission.
(Citations
omitted.)
Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
The Washington Supreme Court cited the Peterson
case when it held a statutory provision, granting a trial de
novo to an applicant for a license, unconstitutional. Household
Finance Corp. v. State, 40 Wash.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260

(1952).

The Washington court upheld the trial court in its conclusion

n,
that the scope of judicial inquiry under the de novo statute
was "limited to determining whether or not the supervisor had
acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law."

262.

Id. at

After noting that the licensing and regulation of small

loan companies was a legislative and administrative function,
the court held:
We are constrained to hold that the portion of Rem.Supp.I941, §8371 23, whlch purports
to vest ln the superlor court for Thurston
county the rlght to reverse on a trlal de novo
a declSlon of the supervlsor Wlth reference to
the grantlng of such. a llcense and, ln effect,
to substltute lts JUdgment for that of the
supervlsor as to whether or not a llcense should
issue, lS unconstltUtlonal as an attempt to
vest a nonJudicial power ln a constitutionally
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created court.
We must reject this expansion
of the court's power as firmly as we would
resist a reduction of its rightful authority.
Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
The Arizona Supreme Court has interpreted Arizona's
various statutes which provide for appeals from administrative
actions in de novo hearings in district court as only providing
the means for the trial court to reach an independent

conclusi~

See Sulger v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 5 Ariz. App. 69, 423 P.2d
145 (1967).
This court has similarly expressed the intent to limit
the scope of judicial review of administrative proceedings.
Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Brimhall,
638

In

28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P.2d

(1972); the court stated:
Our duty is to look upon the whole
evidence in the light favorable to the determination
made by the Bank Commissioner and the trial court,
and to sustain them if there is a reasonable basis
in the evidence to justify doing so.
In the field of administrative law the
tne adm~nlstrator
possess superlor
knowledge and expertlse because of speclallzed
tralning and experlence and the focus of
lnterest Wlthln the Partlcular f~eld.
For
thls reason the well~es~abllshed rule ~s that
the court lndulge ~n hlm conslderable latltude
~n determ~natlons he revokes .
. and they
Wlll not lnterfere therew~th unless lt appears
that ne acted ln excess of h~s powers or-that
he abusec hls dlscretlon that hls actlon was
caprlclous or arbltrary.
See also NCRB v.
Hearst Publlcatlons, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130,
88 L.Ed. 1170, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944) and Hotel
Utah Co. v. Industrial Comm., 116 Utah ~211
P.2d 200, 203 (1949) (empnasis added).
Id. at
641.
assumpt~on ~s lndulged that
(or admin~strat~ve trlbunal)

1 Central Bank involved a complaint filed in district court pursuant to
§7-1-26(4), Utah Code Ann., 1953, ~hich allo~s an appeal from the Bank
Co=issioner' s rulings. The appeal alleged that the Conrrnissioner )-,ad
"acted cap-riciously and arbitraril,·, and contrarv to la••, in denyi:1g itS
application"
a branch
indigitization
Spring,•ille.
The ofSupreme
affirmed tr''
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1 II

_

This court has recognized the existence of the various
shades of meaning of the term "trial de novo."

In Denver

&

R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 98 Utah 431, 100 P.2d 552
(1940), the court noted that such a trial could entail either
a complete retrial upon new evidence or a trial upon the record
made before the lower tribunal.

In analyzing the particular

statute, the court opted for a complete retrial.
be

The test to

applied to deciding this issue was further refined in Denver
R.G.W.R. Co. v. Central Weber Sevier Improvement District,
Utah2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 886

(1955).

The court indicated

that a trial de novo was only appropriate if there was no record
to review or if the procedures used at the hearing might be
violative of due process ..

To this same effect see Citizens

to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 28 L.Ed.2d 136,
91 S.Ct. 814
411 U.S.

(197l)and Camp v. Pitts, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 1243,

138, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973).

It thus becomes imperative to analyze the nature of the
appeal statute involved.

In cases where the Administrator is

contemplating denying the aoplication for a motor vehicle
dealer'slicense, Utah Code Ann., §41-3-24, directs that written
notice be sent to the applicant setting forth a date on which
a hearing will be held before the Administrator for the purpose
of hearing evidence and argument in support of granting the
a~plication.

~y

Section 24 further directs that the Administrator

request the attendance of the Advisory Board (a board of

five members created by U.C.A., §41-3-9, which consists of
individuals whom are motor vehicle dealers, motor vehicle
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wreckers or transporters) or direct the hearing to be held
before said Board.

If, as in the present case, the matter is

referred to the Advisory Board, the Board must make written
findings of fact with appropriate references to the mandatory
stenographic record of the hearing.

In addition, the Board

makes recommendations based upon its findings and any

dissentin~

members may file their own findings of fact and recommendations,,
which become a part of the record.
It would seem that the intent of such an extensive procedure is to insure a fair and adequate hearing of the matter
and to create and preserve a record that could serve as a basis
for judicial review.

It would appear most illogical to provide

for the creation of a special board made up of individuals witl '
expertise in the motor vehicle business who are charged with the
duty of evaluating the fitness of another individual to obtaina
special license which entitles such a person to do business
in the State of Utah and to require that they hire a stenographe:
make written findings and a recommendation to the Administrator
only to have it auotmatically go for naught once an appeal is
merely filed in district court.

It is obvious that every

individual who has been denied a license upon action of the
Advisory Board and Administrator will appeal to the district
court if he gets a true trial de novo with no deference to the
administrative proceeding below.

This vwuld follow since he has

nothing to lose and everything to gain.
The deference to the administrative proceedings in the
licensing of motor vehicle dealers is further demonstrated by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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making reference to Utah Code Ann., §41-3-24 and 25.

Section

24 goes to great length to insure substantial notice and other

due process considerations.

Section 25 empowers the Administra-

tor with extensive subpoena powers over witnesses and papers
both in behalf of the administrative body and the
Again, the

appellant

app_~cant.

will submit that such extensive instruction

provided by the legislature indicates its intent to make the
administrative proceeding the primary determinant of the right
to a motor vehicle dealer's license.

The very section which

gave the respondents the right to appeal the Administrator's
decision is the same section which requires written findings by
the Administrator when making his decision.

It is the appellant's

vigorous contention that when Utah Code Ann., §41-3-26, provides
that an applicant may appeal by filing an original action that
it simply affords the applicant complete due process of law by
providing a review of administrative action to ascertain whether
the administrative body acted properly and within the bounds
of the law.
This "review only" position argued by appellant, finds
additional support by making reference to the statutorily
provided administrative proceeding referred to above and the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) and B:(d).

Rule

Bl(d) makes the provisions of Rule 52(a) applicable to this
review of an administrative decision when it reads:
"These Rules shall apply to the practice
and procedure ln appeallng from or oo~aln
ing a review of any order, rullng or other
action of an administratlve board or agency,
except in so far as the speclflc statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal
review
is Funding
in conflict
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Therefore, Rule 52(a) would be applicable and the
history of the rule is helpful in the instant proceeding.
Rule 52(a) reads in part as follows:
"In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon ... "
In so requiring, one of the major purposes is to
provide a record for later review courts of appeal.
follows in light of the following facts.

This

As noted in the

compiler's notes following Rule 52(a), as set forth in Utah
Code Ann.

(1953), this rule is based upon Rule 52(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Taking this history, Wright

and Miller's observation of the history of Rule 52(a) as
contained in Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 9, becomes
relevant. Those authors explain that this former equity

practi~

is applied to all civil actions tried without a jury "to aid
the appellate court by affording it a clear understanding of
the ground or basis of the decision .... "

Id.at 679.

Other

reasons are also given, but the prime cor.sideration given by
most courts is the creation of a record to review on appeal.
The highest court in New Jersey so stated when it said:
"In recent years this court has been called
upon frequently to point out that such
findings are of the utmost imoortance, not
only in insuring a responsible and just
determination by the board but also in
according a proper basis for the judicial
review which is expressly afforded by
statute and rules."
Pennsylvania R. ~:::. v.
Dept. of Public Utilities, 14 N.J. 4ll, 102
A.2d 618, 626 (1954).
See also Boise Water
Corp. v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 97
Idaho 832, 555 P.2d 163 (1976).
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The Tenth Circuit also considers findings of fact
essential as is demonstrated by the following:
"The intended purpose of the rule
[52(a) FRCP] is to aid the appellate
court in acquiring a clear understanding
of the basis of the decision .... " State
of Utah v. U.S., 304 F. 2d 23 (lOth Cir.
1962), cert. denied 83 S. Ct. 47, 371
u.s. 826. 9 L. Ed. 2D 65. See also,
Whitney v. Continental Life, 403 P.2d 573,
l:l9 Idaho 96 (1965), and Merrill v. Merrill,
362 P. 2d 887, 83 Idaho 306 (1961).
The legislature went to great length in providing an
extensive and expensive two-tiered administrative proceeding.

The initial tier or level, the hearing before the advisory
board, requires a stenographic record, written findings of
fact, and recommendations based thereon at the conclusion
of all testimony and argument.

In addition, any dissenting

member may dissent in writing and this is expressly made a
part of the record.

The second tier is the decision by the

administrator which must be in writing officially signed by
him with reference to the stenographic report of the hearing
as the basis of his action.
The appellant submits that all of the above discussions
lead to the logical conclusion that Utah Code Ann.

§

41-3-26

merely provides for a judicial review and in so doing requires
the district court to view the facts and the law governing
the controversy at the time the administrative hearing took
olace.

The withdrawing of a conviction subsequent to the

ad~inistrative

hearing has no bearing on the instant controversy

whatsoever.
Moreover,
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benefit of the statute that they enacted.

This court has

stat~

that where the intent is unclear, the intent of the legislature
will prevail over the literal sense of meaning, and when words
are not explicit, the intention is to be determined from the
context of the statute.

Rowley v. Public Service Commission,

112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 5!4

(1947).

By placing

§

41-3-26

with its "appeal by filing an original action" language in
context with the other provisions of the chapter dealing with
such proceedings it becomes clear that the intent of the
legislature was to provide a review of the record to

determi~

the lawfulness of the administrative action.
POINT III
AS THE INSTANT PROCEEDING IS A
REVIEW OF THE RECORD OF AN
AD~INISTRATIVE PROCEEDING, THE
FACTS BEFORE THIS COURT ARE THE
FACTS AS THEY EXISTED ON THE
DATE OF THE HEARING BEFORE THE
ADVISORY BOARD
As was established in Point II, supra, the proceeding
before this court, at this, time is in the nature of a review
and not a true trial de novo.

Therefore, it becomes

inc~~bent

upon this court to determine whether the administrative body
properly disposed of the matter.
Utah Code Ann.

§

As was noted in Point II,

41-3-8, expressly gives convictions for

violations of the motor vehicle code, applicable to dealers,
as grounds for refusing a license to a prospective ap?licant.
It seems clear that the relevancy of the conviction to the
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denial of a license is the fact that the applicant has
demonstrated a lack of regard for the very rules he promises
to uphold if a license is issued to him.

In short, the indivi-

dual's character is at issue and in doubt.
With all this in mind, a rule of law established in
Peterson v. Livestock Comm'n, 120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 152
(1947), is proffered by appellant
at hand.

as applicable to the case

2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 757 cites Peterson

for the proposition that changes in law subsequent to an
administrative order should not affect the consideration of the
administrative decision on appeal, i.e., the court on appeal
should apply the substantive law in effect when the agency
made its order.

The Peterson court reasoned:

"It is our conclusion that since the function
of the court on appeal is simply to determine
whether the commission acted properly and
according to law, the court in determining
that question must apply the law in effect
w!-len the commission acted."
181 P.2d at 157.
Appellant submits that the reasoning of the Peterson
court correspondingly mandates that the facts as they existed
when the commission acted, are the facts that the reviewing
court looks at on appeal from a decision of the administrator
of the 1'-lotor Vehicle Business Administration.
The Utah Supreme Court adopted this basic rule in
Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 622,
624

(1964) \vhen it stated:
"[0] rdinarily the facts and the law in a
given lawsuit are to be applied as of the
date of the filing of the original complaint."
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'The court made this statement in response to an argument that
a change in law between the filing of an original complaint
and an amended complaint divested the court of jurisdiction.
For an additional situation wherein a court applied this
principle to a change in fact situation see Heldenbrand v.
Montana St. Bd. of Reg. for P.E. & L.S.
P.2d 744

1

147 Mont. 271 1 41

(1966).
Appellant simply urges the court to review the action

of the administrator in that context.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred when it substituted its judgment
for that of the administrative body because the court only had
jurisdiction to review the propriety of the administrative
order.

The expungement of Mr. Noren's convictions should have

been of no concern to the court in any capacity in which it
heard the case because the convictions are always admissible as
to the issue of an individual's character and corresponding
fitness to hold a public license.

Appellant asks this court

to reverse the lower court so as to sustain the decision of
the Administrator of the Utah State

~~otor

Vehicle Business

Administration.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of September 1 1979.
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